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EQUALITY FOUNDATION OF GREATER
CINCINNATI, INC. v. CITY OF CINCINNATI:
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT NARROWLY
CONSTRUES ROMER v. EVANS
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."' As Justice Harlan said, dissenting over a
century ago in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 the Constitution "neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."3 This idealistic
premise must be balanced against the practical consideration
that most legislation results in burdening some persons while
providing advantages to others.4 The Equal Protection Clause
I U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 255 (1995) (stating that the "Federal Government must be the primary de-
fender of racial minorities against the States, some of which may be inclined to op-
press such minorities"); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277 (1985) (stating that the
Constitution mandates that "all 'persons' shall be accorded the full privileges of citi-
zenship").
2 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (opposing majority holding
that "separate but equal" did not violate equal protection), overruled by Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Id. at 559.
4 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's
promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist
with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or an-
other, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons."); Personnel Adm'r
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) ("Most laws classify, and many affect certain
groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently from all other
members of the class described by law."); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (discussing a state's discretion in classification for legislative
purposes so long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary and is substan-
tially related to the enforcement of the legislation); see also L. Darnell Weeden, Af-
firmative Action California Style--Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoid-
ing a Fatal Constitutional Attraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 281, 285 (1997) ("[Eiqual protection does not mean that laws apply universally
to all persons ... the government must be able to classify special groups or classes of
persons for benefits or burdens if it is to function at all.").
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [73:951
does not forbid the government from making classifications. It
does, however, ensure fair treatment in the exercise of funda-
mental rights by forbidding governmental classifications that are
based upon "impermissible criteria or [are] arbitrarily used to
burden a group of individuals."5 The task of balancing these
competing interests and applying equal protection falls on the
courts, which must delicately measure a challenged law's validity
against constitutional principles.6 In this century, the Supreme
Court has determined that classifications based upon race7 and
national origin are "suspect,"9 and that classifications based
upon gender 10 and illegitimacy" are "quasi-suspect." To date, the
5 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.2, at 597
(5th ed. 1995); J. Michael McGuinness, Equal Protection for Non-Suspect Class Vic-
tims of Governmental Misconduct: Theory and Proof of Disparate Treatment and Ar-
bitrariness Claims, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 356 (1996) (discussing Esmail v.
Macrane, 53 F.3d 1761 (7th Cir. 1995), and noting it "reaffirms [that] the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is not limited to suspect classes or fundamental rights [and that] [t]he
Equal Protection Clause is a foremost means for all individuals, regardless of status,
in the limited arsenal of weapons to combat the increasingly abusive power of gov-
ernment").
6 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985)
(explaining that courts are charged with the responsibility of deciding the validity of
governmental actions and laws challenged as violative of equal protection); Lisa A.
Montanaro, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get the
Hint? Congress' Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal
Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 626 (1994) (explaining that when Congress
"has not used its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass
appropriate legislation ... the courts interpret the Constitution itself by referring to
the equal protection jurisprudence that has evolved throughout the Court's decisions
involving the Equal Protection Clause").
7 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race); see also Griffin v.
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (school desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958) (same). The same principle applies to cases where other racial groups
are impermissibly disadvantaged or given preferential treatment. See, e.g., Hernan-
dez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans).
8 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (hinting
that there might be circumstances where "statutes directed at particular religions,
or national or racial minorities, [and] prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties, may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry") (internal cita-
tions omitted).
9 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 602.
10 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting that gender-
based classifications "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197-98 (1976) (establishing intermediate level scrutiny for gender-based cases);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (striking down law that preferred men over
women as estate administrators).
11 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that intermediate
scrutiny had traditionally applied to "discriminatory classifications based on sex or
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Court has declined to extend either "suspect" or "quasi-suspect"
classification to homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual Americans . 2
In fact, in Bowers v. Hardwick,13 the Supreme Court decided a
case challenging the constitutionality of a state anti-sodomy law
without reaching equal protection issues.1 4
Recently, in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
v. City of Cincinnati,15 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held constitutional a city charter amendment that
forbade the Cincinnati City Council from enacting any legislation
which afforded gays protection against anti-gay discrimination in
housing, employment, or public accommodation. 16
In Equality Foundation, an amendment to the Cincinnati
City Charter ("Charter Amendment" or "Amendment") was
passed by a voter referendum in November 1993.17 The Amend-
ment prohibited the City Council from passing any legislation
that afforded gays "protected status" or "preferential treat-
ment."18 Equality Foundation, Inc.,19 a local gay rights organiza-
tion, brought suit in federal district court, challenging the
illegitimacy"); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (rejecting the argument
that illegitimacy is a suspect class warranting strict scrutiny); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny and concluding that de-
nying an illegitimate child the right to bring a wrongful death action for the loss of
his mother violates the Equal Protection Clause); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1553 (2d ed. 1988).
12 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 601; Louis Norvell, Constitu-
tional Law: Defining the Boundaries of Protected Intimate Associations, 50 FLA. L.
REV. 233, 240 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court has held that homosexual con-
duct is not a protected fundamental right worthy of heightened judicial scrutiny).
13 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14 See id. at 201-02 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting) (disagreeing with "the Court's refusal to consider whether [the chal-
lenged Georgia statute] runs afoul of the... Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment" and observing that "the Equal Protection Clause [is not so]
clearly irrelevant").
15 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (hereinafter Equality Found. IV), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) (mem. opinion by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.).
16 See id. at 292 (adhering to its earlier decision that the charter amendment
"offended neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendments... and accordingly
could stand as enacted by the Cincinnati voters").
17 See id. at 291 (referring to the Amendment as "Issue 3," "Article XII," and the
"City Charter Amendment").
18 Id.
19 The Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. was formed by gay-rights
advocates to oppose the Cincinnati Charter Amendment. After the Cincinnati Char-
ter Amendment's passage, the Equality Foundation among others commenced this
suit. See Sharon Moloney, Case Not Expected to Affect Cincinnati, CINCINNATI POST,
Feb. 21, 1995, at 3A, available in 1995 WL 6923799.
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Amendment on equal protection, due process, and various First
Amendment grounds. 20
The district court found for the plaintiffs and enjoined the
City from enforcing the Charter Amendment. 21 The City ap-
pealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed, 22 holding that the
Amendment did not violate any constitutionally protected
rights.23 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,24 but remanded
the case to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of the
Court's decision in Romer v. Evans,25 which struck down a Colo-
rado state constitutional amendment with language and effect
similar to the Cincinnati Charter Amendment.26 On remand,
however, the Sixth Circuit adhered to its earlier decision and up-
held the Amendment. 27
It is submitted that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued Romer v.
Evans28 in finding the Cincinnati Charter Amendment constitu-
tional. As in Evans, the Equality Foundation Charter Amend-
ment puts homosexuals in a separate class, not to support a le-
gitimate governmental interest, but rather "to make them
unequal to everyone else."29 In order to enact legislation pre-
venting anti-gay bias in Cincinnati, the Charter Amendment re-
quires that proponents go through an arduous two-step process;
first, amending the City Charter, and second, lobbying the City
20 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F.
Supp. 417, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (hereinafter Equality Found. H), rev'd, 128 F.3d 289
(6th Cir. 1997).
21 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 449.
22 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d
261, 271 (6th Cir. 1995) (hereinafter Equality Found. III). Equality Foundation ap-
plied to the Supreme Court for certiorari. See 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). Although the
Court granted certiorari, it vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Tho-
mas, dissented from the decision to remand. See id.
2 See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 271.
24 See Equality Found., 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
25 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Romer v. Evans was decided in May 1996, not quite one
month before the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for further
consideration.
26 See id. at 623 (striking down the state constitutional amendment on equal
protection grounds); infra notes 109-32 and accompanying text (discussing Evans).
27 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
365 (1998).
28 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
29 Id. at 635 (holding that the Colorado Amendment classified homosexuals "to
make them unequal to everyone else").
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Council to enact the desired ordinance.30 Legislation motivated
by a "desire to harm a politically unpopular group,"31 as here,
"cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."32
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the constitutional un-
derpinnings of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection juris-
prudence, the development of a tiered approach to judicial re-
view, and examines the leading cases. Part II discusses the facts
of Equality Foundation, and examines the rationale of the Sixth
Circuit's decision. Part III suggests that the Sixth Circuit erred
in applying Evans; this Part compares the facts of Evans to those
of Equality Foundation, and concludes that Evans's rationale
should have been controlling. Part IV argues further that the
Supreme Court should recognize that homosexuality as a status,
as distinct from homosexual conduct, qualifies for quasi-suspect
classification and intermediate-level review.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws."33 Essen-
tially, it guarantees that "all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike."3 4 Further, "[section 5 of the Amendment empow-
ers Congress to enforce this mandate, but absent controlling con-
gressional direction, the courts have themselves devised stan-
dards for determining the validity of state legislation or other
official action that is challenged as denying equal protection."35
What follows is a brief exposition of the key considerations of
30 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 428 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[A] provision of the City charter may not be repealed short
of amending the charter itself. The charter amendment process... is a burdensome
task... far more onerous than lobbying City Council... for favorable legislation.").
31 Evans, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
32 Id.
33 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has been
developed elsewhere by eminent scholars. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 5; TRIBE supra note 11; Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). Rather than attempting to replicate
work that has been done so well by others, what follows in the text is a brief exposi-
tion of the key considerations of equal protection analysis.
34 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
35 Id. at 439-40; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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equal protection analysis when state action is challenged:36 first,
a discussion of classifications and fundamental rights under the
Equal Protection Clause; and second, an overview of the three
tiers of judicial review: rational basis analysis, strict scrutiny,
and intermediate scrutiny. As will be seen, the appropriate level
of judicial review depends upon whether a fundamental right or a
suspect or quasi-suspect class is affected by the challenged leg-
islation.
A. Classifications and Fundamental Rights Under the Equal
Protection Clause
1. Classifications
The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent the govern-
ment from creating or applying laws that classify persons.37
Classifications based upon legitimate governmental purposes
that do not burden a fundamental right will be upheld.38 If the
classification is proper, equal protection analysis is irrelevant to
a determination of whether a specific individual has been appro-
36 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). The Court
described a two-step inquiry to determine the presence of state action:
[F]irst, whether the claimed constitutional deprivation [of the private per-
son's constitutional rights by the person alleged to be exercising state ac-
tion] resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in
[governmental] authority, and second, whether the private party charged
with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937-42
(1982) (discussing the two-part approach used in determining whether an action can
be "fairly attributable to the State," and determining that when a private creditor
acts jointly with state officers to secure property, Constitutional requirements of due
process apply); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 12.1, at 470 ("[The Amend-
ments to the Constitution which protect individual liberties specifically address
themselves to actions taken by the United States or a state.").
37 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (acknowledging that most laws
classify "for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups
or persons"); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) ("The equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States
all power of classification .... When the basic classification is rationally based, un-
even effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional
concern."); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.2, at 597 (stating "equal protec-
tion... does not reject the government's ability to classify persons or 'draw lines' in
the creation and application of laws...").
38 See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.2, at 597; see also Hodel v.
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981) ("[Llegislation ... that does not employ suspect
classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld.., when the leg-
islative means are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.").
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priately categorized; an equal protection challenge must focus on
the law itself, rather than on any individual impact.39 Thus, the
first step in an equal protection challenge is to examine whether
a law is under-inclusive, 40 over-inclusive, 41 or both.42 Further,
courts also examine whether the classification made by the state
action affects either a "suspect"43 or "quasi-suspect" group.44
2. Fundamental Rights
There are two major groups of fundamental rights consid-
ered in an equal protection challenge. The first of these are those
39 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.2, at 597 ("Equal protection deals
with legislative line-drawing... ."); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 ("The Equal Pro-
tection Clause [is] intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent
with elemental constitutional premises"); R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 175 (1980) ("ITihe Court... has consistently refused to invalidate on equal pro-
tection grounds legislation which it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn.").
40 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.2, at 598-99. "An under-inclusive
classification contains all similarly situated people but excludes some people who are
similar to them in terms of the purpose of the law." Id.; see also Barnhorst v. Mis-
souri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 504 F. Supp. 449,459 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (quot-
ing NOWAK & ROTUNDA).
41 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.2, at 599. A law is "over-inclusive
when the legislative classification includes all persons who are similarly situated in
terms of the law plus an additional group of persons." Id.
42 See id. "Many classifications can be said to be a mix of both over- and under-
inclusions." Id.; see also Evans, 517 U.S. at 633 ("Amendment 2... is at once too
narrow and too broad [because] [iut identifies persons by a single trait and then de-
nies them protection across the board.").
43 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (originating the term,
"suspect," in describing the standard of review which applies to "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group"). Classifications based on race
or national origin are the classic "suspect" categories. See Grifi v. County Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964) (school desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(same); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race).
One startling aspect of Brown is that the Court did not look at the legislative
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was passed as one of the Civil War
Amendments, at a time when African Americans were often not educated. Rather,
the Court examined contemporary education in 1954 to determine whether African
American students were impermissibly disadvantaged by segregated schools. See
Brown, 347 U.S. at 490. This illustrates that the Court will apply established princi-
ples to changing social values.
44 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 603. "In both the illegitimacy
and alienage cases the Supreme Court appears to be using an intermediate or mid-
dle level standard of review.. . ." Id. In gender cases, however, "the Court... no
longer treat[s] sex-based classifications with the judicial deference given economic
regulations; however, it [is] equally clear that such classifications are not subject to
the 'strict scrutiny' given to truly suspect classifications such as those based upon
race." Id. at § 14.20, at 773.
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rights explicitly granted in the Constitution, such as the right to
freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment.45 The other
major area consists of fundamental rights the Supreme Court
has found implied in the Constitution, such as the right to pri-
vacy,46 the right to vote,47 and the right to interstate travel.48
The Court has found that some interests, such as housing, educa-
45 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .... "); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) ("The right
of free speech... [is a] fundamental right]."); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, §
14.40, at 940-42 (discussing application of First Amendment rights to equal protec-
tion).
46 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding there is a right to
privacy respecting a married couple's choice to use contraceptives); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.26, at 796 (stating that privacy, in equal protection and
due process context, "relates to certain rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual,
and reproductive matters"); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)
("[Tihe right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' inplicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment ... .") (emphasis added).
47 See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (reviewing Tennessee's
voting residency requirements with strict scrutiny and noting that while such re-
quirements are legitimate, the right to vote is fundamental and unduly lengthy resi-
dency requirements are improper); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1969) (striking down New York statute limiting eligibility to
vote in school board elections to property owners or parents of children enrolled in
the district); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections., 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) (in-
validating poll tax and noting that right to vote is fundamental); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) (explaining that "the right of suffrage is a fimdamental
matter"); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, §§ 14.31-14.36, at 865-922 (discussing
voting rights and the Equal Protection Clause).
48 See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (striking
down statute limiting non-emergency indigent medical care to residents of over one
year, even though the Court acknowledged the restriction was not a likely to be a
major inhibiting factor on interstate travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969) (invalidating state statutes that restricted qualification for welfare benefits to
residents of more than one year on the grounds that such statutes impair the "fim-
damental right of interstate movement"); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966) ("The constitutional right to travel from one State to another... occupies a
position fundamental to the concept of our [nation]. It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized."). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 5, §§ 14.37-14.38, at 922-38 (discussing right to travel in the context of equal
protection). But see Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (upholding Texas
statute requiring applicants to supply proof of"bona fide" residence in the school dis-
trict); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Minn. 1970) (upholding a resi-
dency requirement for lower tuition rates in state universities). The cases indicate
that although interstate travel is seen as a fundamental right, the importance of the
interest that allegedly inhibits such travel will be a strong factor courts will weigh in
determining if that fundamental right has been infringed upon by challenged legis-
lation.
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tion, entitlement programs, and government employment, are
not fundamental rights for equal protection purposes.49
B. Judicial Review
Where a state action is challenged on constitutional grounds,
there are arguably three main levels of judicial review. These
are rational basis, strict scrutiny, and intermediate or height-
ened scrutiny.50
1. Rational Basis
There is a strong presumption that legislation is constitu-
tional.51 Courts must give legislatures great deference,52 main-
taining the separation among the three branches of government
conceived by the Founders.53 Thus, the general rule is that a
challenged law will stand as long as it is "rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."54 When this standard of review is ap-
49 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (public-
school education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (entitlements); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, §§
14.42-14.46, at 946-59 (discussing non-fundamental rights). For a discussion con-
cerning why the Supreme Court has denied homosexuality to be a fundamental right
based on immutability and generality, see Daniel A. Batterman, Note, Evans v. Ro-
mer. The Political Process, Levels of Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-
Gay Rights Initiatives, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 915 (1995).
50 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 600-06.
51 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (stating that "a classification nei-
ther involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a
strong presumption of validity"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.").
52 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("When social... legislation is at issue, the
Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude"); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974) (restating the oft-cited rule that social legislation will
generally be upheld if it is reasonable and bears a rational relationship to a permis-
sible state objective).
53 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. ("[The Constitution presumes that even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process[].").
5 Id.; see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (reiterating the
general rule); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)
(holding that the standard required only a "plausible" rationale; and that once a
plausible basis is established it is "constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning
in fact underl[ies] the legislative decision"); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
1999]
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plied, a plaintiff bears a heavy burden, and the law will usually
stand.55
2. Strict Scrutiny
Whenever a "suspect class" 56 or a "fundamental right"57 is
implicated by a challenged state action, courts apply strict scru-
tiny.58 Under this approach, the burden shifts, and the state ac-
tion will be upheld only if the state can show that the law is "nar-
rowly tailored" to promote a "compelling"5 9  governmental
interest. "Suspect" classification was developed to ensure special
55 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 601. "So long as it is arguable
that the other branch of government had such a basis for creating the classification a
court should not invalidate the law." Id.; see also Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1, 11 (1988) (upholding state rent control because it was not "arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt")
(internal citations omitted); Borman's, Inc. v. Michigan Prop. & Cas. Guar. Ass'n,
925 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The burden upon a party seeking to overturn a
legislative enactment for irrationally discriminating between groups... is an ex-
tremely heavy one.").
This is not to say that the rational basis standard can not be overcome; laws
which are so far attenuated from the legitimate state interest asserted, or laws
which support an illegitimate governmental purpose will be struck down under even
a rational basis analysis. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (stating that
a "disadvantage... born of animosity toward the class of persons affected" is not a
legitimate government purpose); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (stating that laws "may
not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as
to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational"); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-
63 (1982) (declaring that Alaska statute which offered dividends to longtime resi-
dents was not rationally related to state objectives and was therefore unconstitu-
tional); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding
that "a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group" is not a legitimate
state interest).
56 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing "suspect classifications,"
particularly those based on race or national origin).
57 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing 'Tundamental"
rights under equal protection analysis).
58 See Equality Found. !V, 128 F.3d 289, 292 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct 365 (1998).
Where a statute or ordinance uniquely and adversely impacts a "suspect
class" such as one defined by race, alienage, or national origin, or invades a
"fundamental right" such as speech or religious freedom, the rigorous
"strict scrutiny" standard governs, whereby such laws "will be sustained
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). Cf
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that since
the aged are not deserving of 'suspect' classification, a state statute with a manda-
tory retirement provision was constitutional because it satisfied rational based scru-
tiny).
59 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
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protection for those groups which, because of "widespread, insis-
tent prejudice against them... [are] perennial losers in the po-
litical struggle."60
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
More recently, the Supreme Court has established a middle
ground between these two approaches. Under this approach, in-
termediate or "heightened" scrutiny6' is applied, and a law will
be upheld only if it is "substantially related"62 to "important gov-
ernmental objectives."63 This approach made its debut in Reed v.
Reed,64 and was advanced in Craig v. Boren,65 where it was ap-
plied in a gender-based case.66 In Craig, the Court stated that
Reed was "controlling" and applied the standard that "classifica-
tions by gender must serve important governmental objectives
60 See TRIBE, supra note 11, § 16-6, at 1454. The development of strict scrutiny
for "suspect" classifications was a major step forward in the development of civil
rights; it changed the balance of the weight ofpresumptions. Prior to the recognition
of suspect classifications, plaintiffs were required to overcome the burden of the gen-
eral presumption of legislative validity. The Court's identification of suspect classifi-
cation shifted the burden to the state to show a compelling interest that mandated
upholding the challenged law.
61 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 602-05 (generally introduc-
ing the topic of intermediate-level review).
62 Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289, 292 n.1 ("Where legislation singularly and
negatively affects a 'quasi-suspect' class (i.e., one defined by gender or illegitimacy),
a somewhat less stringent evaluative norm (sometimes called 'intermediate scru-
tiny') controls whereby such legislative classification is deemed valid if it is 'substan-
tially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest'... .") (quoting
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41).
03 Id.
64 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down statute that preferred men over women as
estate administrators). In Reed, the Court purported to apply rational basis analysis,
but rejected the state objectives of "reducing the workload on probate courts" and
"avoiding intrafamily controversy." The rejection was not a failure of the rational
basis test, rather the objectives were not important enough to justify the gender
qualification. See id. at 76-77.
65 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down Oklahoma statute that set the drinking
age for males at 21 and for females at 18).
66 See id. at 197-99. The standard has also been applied in illegitimacy cases.
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (applying heightened scrutiny to classi-
fications based on illegitimacy); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767, 776 (1977)
(applying a middle-level review and invalidating a portion of Illinois inheritance
statute that prevented illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers); Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1968) (applying rational basis to strike down Lou-
isiana bar against illegitimate children's standing to sue for wrongful death of their
mother); TRIBE, supra note 11, §16-24, at 1553 (suggesting that although the Court
stated it was applying rational basis review in Levy, that it was in fact using strict
scrutiny).
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and must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those
objectives."67 Reed paved the way for decisions invalidating stat-
utes disadvantaging females that were based on out-dated gen-
eralizations concerning the proper role for women at home and in
the workplace. 68 In 1996, in United States v. Virginia,69 the Su-
preme Court signaled a higher standard within this middle tier,
by requiring "exceedingly persuasive" justification 70 in order to
satisfy the "substantially related" prong.
C. Applying Judicial Review
"The search for the link between classification and objective
gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; it provides guid-
ance and discipline for the legislature.., and it marks the limits
of [judicial] authority."71 Over the years, the Supreme Court
found that classifications based on race and national origin72 are
suspect, that classifications based on illegitimacy 73 and gender 74
are quasi-suspect, and has applied the developed levels of review
to uphold or strike down challenged laws.
67 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
68 See id.; see also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975) (holding that the
purpose of fostering "old notions" of role typing not sufficient to uphold differential
in Utah age-of-majority statute); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975)
(working women); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) ("archaic and
overbroad" generalizations); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.23 (1973)
(servicewomen).
69 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (rejecting Virginia's
bid to maintain Virginia Military Institute, VMI, as an all-male institution).
70 Id. at 533 (noting that gender-based classifications "must not rely on over-
broad generalizations about the different... capacities... of males and females");
see also Christina Gleason, Comment, United States v. Virginia: Skeptical Scrutiny
and the Future of Gender Discrimination Law, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 801,807 (1996)
(discussing the exceedingly persuasive justification requirement in gender discrimi-
nation cases, suggesting a tougher standard within the intermediate level of review).
71 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
72 See supra note 43 (discussing "suspect classifications," particularly those
based on race or national origin).
73 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-63 (1988) (applying heightened scrutiny
to classifications based on illegitimacy); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)
(applying middle-level review and invalidating a portion of Illinois inheritance stat-
ute that prevented illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (applying rational basis to strike down Louisiana bar
against illegitimate children's standing to sue for wrongful death of their mother).
74 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (discussing application of in-
termediate-level review to gender-based cases).
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D. Gays and the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court, however, has thus far declined to ac-
knowledge that homosexuals as a group merit any level of pro-
tected status.75 As will be discussed below, Bowers v. Hardwick7 6
established a conduct-based justification for upholding an anti-
sodomy law that "stands as the cornerstone-or stumbling
block--of all current attempts to gain Fourteenth Amendment
protections for homosexuals."77 Post-Hardwick, the circuit courts
deciding the issue of whether sexual orientation is a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification have decided that it is neither; they
have followed Hardwick's focus on homosexual conduct rather
than homosexuality as a status.78
1. Homosexual Conduct
In Bowers v. Hardwick,7 9 decided in 1986, the Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision,80 held that a Georgia statute
75 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.3, at 601; see also John Charles
Hayes, Note, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexu-
als and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L.
REV. 375, 375 (1990) (explaining that the courts have "rebuffed attempts by homo-
sexuals to seek redress through statutory and constitutional claims").
76 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
77 Wayne Biggs, Casenote, Hitting the Home Run or Wishful Thinking: Cincin-
nati's Issue Three and the Significance of Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 223 (1995) (commenting
on the district court decision in Equality Found. ID. For a history of gay-rights cases
leading up to and following Hardwick, see Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993). See also Andrew M.
Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement,
1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REV. 723 (1993); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285
(1985) (a pre-Hardwick call for equal protection for homosexuals).
78 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
571-72 n.6, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that homosexuality is behavioral);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding homo-
sexuals not suspect or quasi-suspect because homosexuality is "primarily behavioral
in nature"); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that if homosexual conduct may be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute
suspect or quasi-suspect classification); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that Hardwick is an "insurmountable barrier[]" to giving quasi-
suspect classification to gays).
79 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
80 See id. Justice White wrote the Court's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. See id. at 187. Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell also each filed concurring opinions. See id. at 196 (Bur-
ger) and 197 (Powell). Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan,
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criminalizing consensual sodomy was constitutional.81 Justice
White framed the issue as "whether the... Constitution confers
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make
such conduct illegal.. . ."82 The Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit,83 which had held that the Georgia anti-sodomy statute
interfered with the fundamental due process right to make "cer-
tain individual decisions critical to personal autonomy [that] are
essentially private and beyond the legitimate reach of a civilized
society."84 The Court stated that its earlier decisions in the areas
of child-rearing and education,85 procreation, 86 and family rela-
tionships8 7 bore no "resemblance to the claimed constitutional
right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy"88 and that
there was "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procrea-
tion on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other .... -89
Following the Court's earlier standards articulated in Palko v.
Connecticut9 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,91 the Court
declined to expand the right of privacy to encompass homosexual
conduct because "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct
Marshall, and Stevens. See id. at 199. Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissent,
in which he was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. See id. at 214.
81 See id. at 187-96.
82 Id. at 190.
83 See id. at 196 (reversing the Eleventh Circuit's decision).
84 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 1985).
85 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
86 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190; see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (procreation); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (procreation); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (child-
bearing); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation).
87 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family relationships); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (same).
88 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
89 Id. at 191.
90 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (defining fundamental liberties as those that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty... [such that] neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed").
91 431 U.S. at 503 (defining fundamental liberties as those that are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
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is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."92
After finding that earlier precedent provided no foundation
for a finding that a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
conduct existed, the Court further cautioned against "dis-
cover[ing] new fundamental rights."93 "The Court is most vul-
nerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots
in the language or design of the Constitution."94 Therefore, there
should be "great resistance to expand the substantive reach" of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 95
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall and Stevens, disagreed with the majority's view
that the case was about whether there is a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual conduct.96 Rather, they saw the issue as
one of privacy, " 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.'
"97 Justice Blackmun would have held that the Constitution
guarantees individuals a privacy right to "decide for themselves
whether to engage in particular forms of private, consensual sex-
ual activity."8 Justice Blackmun felt the traditional areas of pri-
vacy-marriage, family, and procreation-are protected "not be-
cause they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the
general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of
92Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (quoting Palko and Moore). One
of the main problems with the point of view that only those rights "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition" is that when the nation was founded, African
Americans were kept in slavery, and women did not get the right to vote in national
elections until 1920, and yet the law and society have advanced to offer protections
to both African Americans and women. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex."). Past inequities cannot justify perpetuating policies
violative of constitutional protections as we come to understand them.
93 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 195.
95 See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97 See id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)).
98 Id. ("I believe we must analyze Respondent Hardwicks claim in the light of
the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy.").
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an individual's life."99 In Justice Blackmun's view, a person's
sexual life is so central that the right to privacy includes the
right to consensual sex.1°° Justice Blackmun went on to say, "in-
dividuals define themselves in a significant way through their in-
timate sexual relationships"10 1 and that, therefore, these rela-
tionships fit within established privacy protections. 102 In his
view, the majority's focus on homosexuality in construing the
challenged Georgia statute was misguided.103 Justice Blackmun
concluded that since the language of the statute prohibited cer-
tain sexual conduct regardless of whether the participants were
heterosexual or same-sex partners, 0 4 the "sex or status of the
persons who engage in the act is irrelevant as a matter of state
law."105 This is a key point, as Hardwick was decided on conduct-
based due process grounds, 106 yet its progeny, 07 including Equal-
ity Foundation,03 found Hardwick a bar to finding in favor of
homosexuals on status-based equal protection claims.
99 Id. at 204.
100 See id. at 205.
101 Id.
102 See id. "[Tihe Court's conclusion that [privacy protections] extend no further
than this boundary [of family] ignores the warning... against 'clos[ing] our eyes to
the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded
shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.' "Id. at 204 (quot-
ing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977)).
103 See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (Michie 1996) (defining the criminal defenses
of sodomy and aggravated sodomy); see also Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 ("[Tbo the ex-
tent I can discern a legislative purpose for [the] ... enactment of [the statute], that
purpose seems to have been to... reach heterosexual as well as homosexual activ-
ity") (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that recently, in Powell v.
State, the Supreme Court of Georgia overturned that provision of the Georgia Code,
as violative of the state constitution. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga.
1998).
105 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although the dissent
made the point that the challenged statute was not gender-specific, Justice Black-
mun would have found a fundamental liberty in the conduct itself. See id. at 208
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 See id. at 196 (opinion of the Court).
107 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing cases defining homo-
sexuality as conduct rather than status).
108 Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
365 (1998) (stating that "homosexuals d[o] not constitute either a 'suspect class' or a
'quasi-suspect class' because the conduct which define[s] them as homosexuals [i]s
constitutionally proscribable) (citing Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d 261, 266-67 & n.2
(6th Cir. 1995)).
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2. Homosexuality as a Status
Ten years after Hardwick, in Romer v. Evans,10 9 the Court
struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment
("Amendment 2" or "Colorado Amendment")" ° that prevented the
state or any local government from passing legislation designed
to grant protected status and prohibit discrimination based on "
'homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.' ""' Amendment 2 was challenged in Colorado
state court," 2 and ultimately, in the Colorado Supreme Court.
Colorado's Supreme Court held that Amendment 2, which made
amendment of the state constitution an obstacle to passage of
any future gay-rights legislation,113 "infringed [upon] the funda-
mental rights of gays and lesbians to participate in the political
process."" 4 Holding that participation in the political process
109 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
110 See Evans, 517 U.S. at 623. The text of the Amendment is as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orienta-
tion. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordi-
nance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, con-
duct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
111 Evans, 517 U.S. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. H, § 30b, passed by the
state's voters as "Amendment 2"). As Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, ex-
plains, Amendment 2 was adopted in a 1992 statewide voter referendum. See id. at
623. The Colorado Amendment was prompted by several municipal ordinances that
prohibited discrimination in housing, employment, and public accommodation, and
included protections against anti-gay discrimination, along with the more tradition-
ally accepted status-based groups, such as race, national origin, and gender. See id
at 623-24 (citing DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE art. IV, §§ 28-91-28-116 (1991);
BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1-12-1-11 (1987); ASPEN, COLO., REV. CODE §
13-98 (1977)). The local ordinances defined "sexual orientation" in terms of status, as
opposed to conduct. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 624 (noting that the Boulder Code de-
fined "sexual orientation" in terms of choice of sexual partners) (quoting BOULDER
REV. CODE § 12-1-1); see also id. (explaining that the Denver Code defined "sexual
orientation" in terms of the "status of an individual as to his or her heterosexuality,
homosexuality or bisexuality") (quoting DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE art. IV, §
28-92).
112 See Evans, 517 U.S. at 625.
113 See id. at 631 (noting that homosexuals "can obtain specific protection
against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State
Constitution").
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constituted a fundamental right, the Colorado court applied strict
scrutiny and struck down Amendment 2.115
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment,
but did not adopt the rationale of the Colorado court. 116 The
Court disagreed with the Colorado court's finding that Amend-
ment 2 affected any fundamental right, because the right to par-
ticipate in the political process is not a fundamental constitu-
tional right.117 Instead, the Court examined Amendment 2 using
traditional rational basis analysis," 8  and found that the
Amendment both impermissibly singled out an unpopular group
for discrimination based on animosity 1 9 and was too tenuously
connected to any legitimate state purpose. 120 The Court soundly
rejected Colorado's argument that Amendment 2 merely "puts
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons," and
that it "does no more than deny homosexuals special rights."12 1
114 Id. at 625; see also Evans v. Roner, 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1993) (herein-
after Evans I) (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the fundamen-
tal right to participate equally in the political process and that any attempt to in-
fringe on an independently identifiable group's ability to exercise that right is
subject to strict judicial scrutiny").
115 See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1286.
116 See Evans, 517 U.S. at 626. The decision was six to three. Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas.
117 See id. (relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). Justice Scalia
noted:
The Court evidently agrees that "rational basis"-the normal test for com-
pliance with the Equal Protection Clause-is the governing standard....
And the Court implicitly rejects the Supreme Court of Colorado's hold-
ing... that Amendment 2 infringes upon a "fundamental right" of "inde-
pendently identifiable class[es]" to "participate equally in the political proc-
ess."
Id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118 See id. at 631-35; see also supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing rational basis analysis). The two bases for finding a law invalid under the
rational basis standard are that it is motivated by an illegitimate state purpose, or
that it is too far removed from any legitimate one. See supra note 55.
119 See Evans, 517 U.S. at 632. "Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this con-
ventional inquiry. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional
and... invalid form of legislation." Id.
120 See id. "[The amendment's] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the rea-
sons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state inter-
ests." Id.
121 Id. at 626.
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In the Court's reading, these so-called "special rights" are merely
the "safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without con-
straint,"122 such as protection against discrimination in public ac-
commodations, licensing, and employment.123  The Colorado
Amendment barred any governmental unit in the state from pro-
viding any protection against discriminatory actions based on
anti-gay bias, an obstacle imposed only on those of homosexual
status.124 Amendment 2 was a "status-based enactment divorced
from any factual context from which [the Court] could discern a
relationship to legitimate state interests."125
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented, relying on three main premises.126 First, that
Bowers v. Hardwick 27 controls the arena and contradicts the
majority's "holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for
disfavorable treatment."128 Justice Scalia reasoned that if it is
permissible to criminalize conduct, then it is also acceptable to
make laws that discriminate against those who engage in that
conduct.129 Second, the dissent found that "Amendment 2 does
not deprive homosexuals of the 'protection [afforded by] general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in gov-
ernmental and private settings,' "130 and therefore they are not
deprived of the same protections the rest of us have.131 Finally,
Id. at 631.
m See id. at 629.
124 See id. at 629-30.
m Id. at 635.
126 See id. at 636-40.
w 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also supra notes 79-108 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Hardwick Court's view of homosexuality as conduct, which can be con-
trolled through legislation, rather than as a classification, falling under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
128 Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
m See id. at 641.
130 Id. at 637 (quoting Evans, 517 U.S. at 630 (opinion of the Court)).
131 See id. at 637-38. Justice Scalia seems to blithely suggest that if a gay per-
son is denied a job or an apartment because he or she is gay, and if he or she hap-
pens to belong to another group protected by local human rights ordinances in Colo-
rado, that he or she has the same recourse as any other Coloradan. See id.
("[G]eneral laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination would continue
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of homosexual conduct as well.") (internal
quotations omitted). The majority pointed out, however, that if a homosexual person
were to bring a claim under a Colorado law prohibiting arbitrary discrimination:
an official must determine whether homosexuality is an arbitrary and,
thus, forbidden basis for decision. Yet a decision to that effect would itself
amount to a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of homosexual-
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persisting in seeing homosexuality solely in terms of sexual con-
duct, Justice Scalia found that Amendment 2 met the rational
basis requirement. 13 2
II: EQUALITYFOUNDATION OF GREATER CINCINNATI, INC. V.
CITY OF CINCINNATI
A. The Cincinnati Voter Referendum
In 1991 and 1992, respectively, the Cincinnati City Council
enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Ordinance
("EEO")133 and the Human Rights Ordinance ("HRO"). 13 4 Op-
posing the protection given to gays under the two ordinances, a
group known as Equal Rights Not Special Rights ("ERNSR")135
started a campaign to amend the Charter of the City of Cincin-
nati to disallow the portions of the ordinances directed against
ity, and so would appear to be no more valid under Amendment 2 than the
specific prohibitions against discrimination the state court held invalid.
Id. at 630.
m See id. at 640-43. Justice Scalia would also deny the claim because it is a fa-
cial challenge, and in his view the plaintiffs have not met their burden for that
challenge. Facial challenges are the most difficult to prove. See id. at 643. When a
law is challenged "on its face," a plaintiff must prove that there is no conceivable
string of circumstances where it might, however improbably, be valid. See id. (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). When a law is challenged "as
applied," the plaintiff must establish not that the law can never be applied in any
valid way, as in the facial challenge; rather, he or she must show that the law has
been applied in an unconstitutional fashion. See id.
133 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 421 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing CINCINNATI, OHIO, CITY ORDINANCE No. 79-1991).
The EEO prohibited discrimination in city employment and appointments to city
boards and commissions, based on sexual orientation, race, color, sex, disability, re-
ligion, national or ethnic origin, age, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and
marital status. See id.
134 See id. The HRO, as originally enacted, prohibited discrimination in "private
employment, public accommodations and housing." Id. at 421. The HRO details the
same list as does the EEO of discrete groups or defining traits that shall not be dis-
criminated against: sexual orientation, race, color, sex, disability, religion, national
or ethnic origin, age, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital status.
See id. The HRO also has a severability clause, providing that it is the "controlling
legislative intent that if any provisions of [the HRO], or the application thereof... is
held to be invalid, the remaining sections ... shall not be affected thereby.. . ." Id.
at 421 n.3. The words "sexual orientation" were deleted from the HRO by the City
Council on March 8, 1995, ater Issue 3 was passed. See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d
261, 271 (6th Cir. 1995).
135 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 422.
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anti-gay discrimination.18 6 ERNSR was successful, and Issue 3,
appending Article XII to the City Charter, was placed on the No-
vember 1993 ballot.13 7 The Amendment had the effect of pre-
cluding the City Council from making any future ordinances that
afforded gays "protected status" or "preferential treatment."
138
ERNSR's campaign for Issue 3 rested largely on the idea that
gays should not be granted "special rights."139 The campaign was
hotly contested by, among others, the Equality Foundation of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. ("Equality Foundation").14° After a "bit-
ter and often inflammatory campaign," the measure was passed
on November 2, 1993.141 Equality Foundation challenged Issue 3
in federal district court' 42 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,14 challenging
136 See id. "The Charter of the City of Cincinnati is akin to a local constitu-
tion.... Generally, local laws must comply with the Charter." Equality Found. of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (S.D. Ohio
1993) (granting preliminary injunction) (hereinafter Equality Found. 1). Amending
the City Charter is "a burdensome task that requires a city wide campaign and sup-
port of a majority of the voters; a far more onerous task than lobbying the City
Council or City administration... ."Id. at 1237.
In See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 422. Issue 3 provides in full:
ARTICLE Xri NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED
UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not
enact, adopt, enforce or adminiter any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status,
conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person
with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota
preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the City Char-
ter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or
policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing
prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Id.
The last paragraph not-too-subtly refers to the EEO and to the HRO. The
Amendment, because it is self-executing, has the effect of repealing two ordinances,
duly enacted by the Cincinnati City Council, without a public hearing or any for-
mality at all.
138 Id.
139 Id.; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting "special rights"
issue in Romer v. Evans).
140 See Equity Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 422. It seems that there was hyperbole
and outright misinformation on both sides of the issue: ERNSR ran ads associating
homosexuals with pedophiles, and characterizing homosexuality as "simply a matter
of 'who one chooses to have sex with'...." Id. (referring to Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and
27). Equality Foundation, for its part, bought "notorious ... ubiquitous 'Hitler-KKK-
McCarthey' [sic] billboards." Id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. I. 1996). The text of the statute is as follows:
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the constitutionality of Issue 3. Equality Foundation argued that
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals should be "classified as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class," and therefore entitled to strict scrutiny;144
that even under the less stringent rational basis level of review,
Issue 3 violated the Due Process Clause;145 that Issue 3 violated
the plaintiffs' fundamental rights, under the First Amend-
ment,146 to "free speech and association and to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances";147 and that Issue 3 violated
the plaintiffs' "Fundamental Right to equal participation in the
political process."' 48 Equality Foundation also sought a prelimi-
nary injunction barring enforcement of Issue 3, which was
granted by the Southern District of Ohio.149
B. The District Court Decisions (Equality Foundation I and II)
The district court, in a sensitive' 50 and thoughtful opinion,
"expressly reject[ed] the notion that homosexual orientation is
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
Id.
144 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 434 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
145 See id. at 440. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
146 See Equality Found. H, 860 F. Supp. at 429. The First Amendment of the
Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech... or the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
147 Equality Found. 1I, 860 F. Supp. at 429.
148 Id. at 430.
149 See Equality Found. I, 838 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction).
150 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 421. The court was diplomatic in in-
validating the Charter Amendment in stating that the "decision represents the cul-
mination of at least one phase of an emotional, highly controversial and hotly con-
tested law suit." Id. at 420. Further, the court said that "[b]oth sides have been
represented by extremely competent and thoroughly prepared attorneys who pre-
sented their respective cases forcefully and persuasively." Id. at 420-21.
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'defined by' any conduct ... .1 51  The court acknowledged that
the consensus among the various circuits of the United States
Court of Appeals was that gays do not constitute a quasi-suspect
class. 152 The court found a distinction between volitional conduct
and immutable status. 153 The court stated that the line of cases
denying gays quasi-suspect classification were all based on ho-
mosexuality as a conduct, rather than homosexuality as a
status.154 The court held, first, that gays meet the criteria for
quasi-suspect class, and therefore the challenged state action
must meet heightened scrutiny; 55 second, that Issue 3 did not
even pass a rational basis analysis;156 third, that the Amendment
151 Id. at 440.
152 See id. at 439.
15 See id.
154 See id. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (conduct);
see also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571-
72 n.6, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that homosexuality is behavioral); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,464 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that if homosexual con-
duct may be criminalized, "then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class"); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(holding homosexuals not a suspect or quasi-suspect class because homosexuality is
"primarily behavioral in nature"); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102-03 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (holding that Hardwick is an "insurmountable barrier" to giving quasi-
suspect classification to gays).
15 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997). The court defined factors to be considered in determining
whether a group constitutes a quasi-suspect class. See id. These factors are:
(1) whether an individual's sexual orientation bears any relationship to his
or her ability to perform, or to participate in, or contribute to, society;
(2) whether the members of the group have any control over their sexual
orientation;
(3) whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic;
(4) whether that group has suffered a history of discrimination based on
their sexual orientation; and
(5) whether the class is "politically powerless."
Id.
15 See id. at 440. The court found that, "although a classification must be up-
held under the rational basis standard if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification, 'even the standard of
rationality... must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the
legislation.' "Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)). The presumption
of legitimacy is a strong one, and most laws analyzed under this standard will be
upheld. However, "some objectives-such as 'a bare ... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group'-are not legitimate state interests." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985) (citations omitted). " '[Mere negative atti-
tudes, or fear,' of a given group, will not suffice as a legitimate governmental pur-
pose." Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 440 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439).
The court noted that private biases are outside the law's jurisdiction, yet "the law
'cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.' "Id. at 441 (quoting Palmore v. Si-
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to the City Charter was unconstitutionally vague, therefore vio-
lating due process; 157 and finally, that Issue 3 had a deterrent ef-
fect on the fundamental rights to free speech and equal access to
the political process, requiring that the law must meet strict
scrutiny review.158 The court stated that "any legislation that
disadvantages an independently identifiable group of people by
making it more difficult for that group to enact legislation in its
behalf, 'fences' that group out of the political process, and thereby
violates their fundamental rights."159
This argument goes too far. It essentially says that if one
can identify any distinct group and demonstrate that a law
makes it more difficult for that group to pass legislation, then
that law will impinge a fundamental right and require strict
scrutiny. This thinking could render moot the distinction be-
doti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). The court found the proposed legitimate state pur-
poses justifying the Amendment unconvincing. See id.
157 See id. at 447-48. The court found that evidence that there was "[confusion
surrounding Issue 3's scope and impact was abundant at trial and otherwise on the
record." Id. at 448. "In fact, the Defendants' own witnesses offered differing views
regarding Issue 3's scope." Id. This is exactly the sort of evil the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is designed to prevent. Legislation must not be broader than necessary to
fulfill its objectives, and it must be sufficiently clear so that it can be even-handedly
applied. "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vague-
ness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972); see also Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250,
251-52 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing the applicable standard to determine if a statute
is unconstitutionally vague); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822
F.2d 1390, 1399 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding an ordinance which provided for the dis-
posal of fetal remains in a manner as proscribed by the health commission vague for
failure to provide sufficient warning to potential violators); Hoffman Estates v. Flip-
side, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (explaining that "[tihe degree of vagueness that the
Constitution tolerates.., depends in part on the nature of the enactment)." Vague
laws are offensive, first, because they "may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning" and second, because laws must "provide explicit standards for those who
apply them" in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned,
408 U.S. at 108. Laws, in general, must not be too broad or too vague, but when a
fundamental right is at issue, a vague law operates to have a chilling effect on the
exercise of that right. See id. at 109.
The court found that "[o]n its very face, Issue 3 lends itself to contradictory in-
terpretations." Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 448. Due to the law's ambiguities,
persons will "steer clear of... lawful conduct... [and] have a more restrictive life
imposed upon them than the law requires.. . ." Id. at 449. The court concluded that
Issue 3, which has the potential for criminal penalties, does not give fair warning.
See id. Additionally, Issue 3's vagueness could lead to discriminatory enforcement.
See id.
158 See id. at 430 (holding that "Issue 3 violates the Plaintiffs' Fundamental
Right to Equal access to the political process").
159 Id. (citing Equality Found. 1, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1238-42 (S.D. Ohio 1993)).
[73:951
EQUALITYFOUNDATION
tween intermediate and strict level scrutinies, and require strict
scrutiny for just about any equal protection challenge.160
The Equality Foundation II court found that Issue 3, by re-
quiring a charter amendment be passed before any future City
Council ordinances giving protected status or preferential treat-
ment to gays, placed an "added and virtually insurmountable
burden" in the way of future gay rights legislation in Cincinnati,
and that as such, it denied gay Cincinnatians their fundamental
right to equal participation in the political process.161
Further, the court found that since the Amendment elimi-
nated any protection for gays, that campaigning in favor of a
charter amendment as a first step toward establishing that pro-
tection would "expose [gays] to discrimination for which they will
have no recourse... to obtain protection, thereby increasing the
risks of, and consequently chilling, such expression."162 The dis-
trict court granted a permanent injunction barring the enforce-
ment of Issue 3,163 and the City appealed.
C. The First Sixth Circuit Decision (Equality Foundation III)
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed.'6 First, the court
found that Bowers v. Hardwick165 "command[s] that, as a matter
of law, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute either a
'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect class.' "166 Second, it held that no
160 See id. at 430 (summarizing Cincinnati's argument that if this thinking were
followed, it would mean that "no issue could be relegated to the charter amendment
process" because the proponents of any amendment are an "identifiable group").
161 Id. at 433.
162 Equality Found. I, 838 F. Supp. at 1242 (granting preliminary injunction);
see also Equality Found. I, 860 F. Supp. 417, 445 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming its earlier decision).
163 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 449.
164 See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d 261,271 (6th Cir. 1995).
165 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
16 Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 268. The court stated that "[s]ince Bowers,
every circuit court which has addressed the issue has decreed that homosexuals are
entitled to no special constitutional protection, as either a suspect or a quasi-suspect
class, because the conduct which places them in that class is not constitutionally
protected." Id. at 266. The Sixth Circuit was convinced that homosexuality was and
should continue to be defined by conduct. See id. at 267; see also Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (characterizing homosexuality as status
defined by conduct); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895
F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that homosexuals may not expect equal pro-
tection because their identifying conduct may be constitutionally criminalized);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that ho-
mosexuality is primarily behavioral and therefore subject to change, rather than
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fundamental right was affected by the Amendment. 167 Conclud-
ing, therefore, that rational basis was the proper level of re-
view, 16 8 the court held that Issue 3 survived rational basis analy-
being an immutable status, and stating that after Hardwick there is no constitu-
tional impediment to discrimination against gays); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d
454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that since homosexual conduct may be criminalized
those with homosexual status may not expect equal protection); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (categorizing homosexuality as status-based).
The court stated that "[tihose persons having a homosexual 'orientation' simply
do not, as such, comprise an identifiable class." Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 267.
In fact, the court said, "[many homosexuals successfully conceal their orientation."
Id. This is fatuous reasoning the court ignores that the reason many gay Americans
may stay "in the closet" is to avoid discrimination they might be subject to if they
were "out." An interesting comparison could be drawn to the days of Jim Crow, when
light-skinned African Americans "passed" as white so that they could enjoy the full
range of civil rights. Furthermore, the court argued that even if the focus were on
homosexuality as status, rather than homosexual conduct, the Amendment passes
constitutional equal protection scrutiny because "it imposes no punishment or dis-
ability upon persons belonging to that group but rather merely removes previously
legislated special protection.. . ." Id. at 267 n.4. This is the same argument the Su-
preme Court rejected as "implausible" in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996).
167 See Equity Found III., 54 F.3d at 269. The court compared other cases in-
volving voter-approved amendments and concluded that those cases rose or fell
based on whether the amendments affected a suspect or quasi-suspect class or per-
sons, not on whether requiring a majority approval impacted any fundamental right
to participate in the political process. See id. Compare Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484-87 (1982) (invalidating a voter-approved initiative de-
signed to prevent bussing of schoolchildren for the purpose of racial integration) and
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to invali-
date a voter-approved amendment to a city charter forbidding the city council to
legislate on race-based prohibition against discrimination in private housing without
the prior approval of a majority of the voters) with James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
140-41 (1971) (holding that, although the voter-approved amendment imposed the
same procedural impediment as Hunter, that the requirement of a majority vote be-
fore an action was taken would not invalidate the amendment because it was neu-
tral on its face and no fundamental right to participation in the political process was
found).
The court concluded that the Amendment did not"impair homosexuals and other
interested parties from seeking to repeal the Amendment.... ."Equality Found. III,
54 F. Supp. at 269. Also, that it "deprived no one of the right to vote, nor did it re-
duce the relative weight of any person's vote." Id. The court found Equality Founda-
tion's arguments that the Amendment had a chilling effect on political speech un-
availing. See id. The court stated that the First Amendment "prohibits only
governmental burdens upon speech" and "does not command the government to in-
sulate any person from the effects of private action resulting from the exercise of free
speech or association rights." Id. It found that protection against discrimination in
private employment potentially resulting from bias against homosexuals was not
mandated by the Constitution. See id. at 269-70.
168 See id. at 270. As discussed supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, ra-
tional basis analysis is applied where there is no suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tion impacted and when there is no fundamental right burdened. See Equality
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sis.169 Further, the court was unconvinced by the void-for-
vagueness finding of the lower court. °70 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
reversed, and vacated the injunction.17 '
Equality Foundation petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, which was granted on June 17, 1996.172 The
Supreme Court, however, having decided Romer v. Evans173 less
Found. III, 54 F.3d at 270. Under rational basis review, the challenged legislation
must stand unless there is no conceivable basis connecting the legislation to a le-
gitinate state interest, "regardless of whether or not such supporting rationale
was... actually relied upon by the promulgating authority." Id. "Indeed, in the ref-
erendum context, it is impermissible for the reviewing court to inquire into the pos-
sible actual motivations of the electorate in adopting the proposal." Id. at 270 n.9; see
also Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 815 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting policy con-
siderations in limiting a court's examination of the factors motivating the electorate
in a referendum); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986) (reiter-
ating the impermissibility of inquiring into the motivation of voters).
10 See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 270. The court was convinced by the
City's arguments suggesting legitimate state interests rationally related to the
Amendment. See id. (stating that the City presented a "litany of valid community
interests," including that of "encourag[ing] enhanced associational liberty on the
part of Cincinnati residents.., by eliminating exposure to the punishment man-
dated by the Human Rights Ordinance against certain persons who elected to disas-
sociate themselves from homosexuals").
This argument, that associational liberty is enhanced by permitting one group of
persons to prevent another group, based on their status, from free association in the
community, seems to employ Orwellian Newspeak. See generally GEORGE ORWELL,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 5 (1949) ("War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is
strength."); see id. at 215 ("Doublethink means the power of holding two contradic-
tory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them."). It also
sounds like the Vietnam-era maxim, "It became necessary to destroy the town in or-
der to save it." Anonymous, BARTLITS FAMalAR QUOTATIONS, 784 6 (Justin
Kaplin ed., 16th ed. 1992) (attributing remark to American officer outside Ben T1re,
Vietnam) (from N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1968).
170 See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d 261, 271 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth Circuit
found that the argument that Issue 3 was vague was unripe, since the plaintiff had
"suffered no actual or imminent injury by the implementation of the Amendment"
but "merely asserted an abstract hypothetical scenario and conjectured that it was
unable to determine if the employment of a homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual because
of his or her sexual orientation would be civilly or criminally actionable under the
Human Rights Ordinance as anti-heterosexual discrimination." Id. The court further
stated that the "vagueness issue has been rendered moot by Council's March 8, 1995
amendment to the Human Rights Ordinance ... which struck all references to 'sex-
ual orientation' from the legislation." Id. For the original text of the HRO, see supra
note 134. The court again uses faulty logic. The deletion of the words "sexual orien-
tation" was surely motivated by Issue 3. If Issue 3 is unconstitutional, then the dele-
tion was unnecessary.
171 See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 271.
172 See 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (mer.) (Rehnquist, CJ. and Scalia and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting from decision to remand).
173 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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than a month earlier, on May 20, 1996, vacated the judgment of
the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case "for further considera-
tion in light of Romer v. Evans."174
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented from the denial of certiorari.175 The dissent-
ing justices saw a distinction between Evans and Equality Foun-
dation that they felt made reconsideration unnecessary. Justice
Scalia said that Evans involved a "constitutional amendment
prohibiting special protection for homosexuals... [while tihe
present case, by contrast, involves a determination by what ap-
pears to be the lowest electoral subunit that it does not wish to
accord homosexuals special protection."176 He stated that the
"consequence of holding this provision unconstitutional would be
that nowhere in the country may the people decide, in democratic
fashion, not to accord special protection to homosexuals."177 Jus-
tice Scalia saw this distinction between state constitution and lo-
cal city charter amendments as an "ultra-Romer" issue, which he
suggested might be appropriate for the Court to decide. 7 8
It seems that the distinction between Evans and Equality
Foundation asserted by Justice Scalia is the axiomatic "distinc-
tion without a difference." He appears to be saying that what is
unconstitutional at the state level is permitted at the local level.
This is contrary to general constitutional principles, which allow
states to provide broader protections for their citizens than the
Federal Constitution provides, but that the reverse is, of course,
not true. 79 If a state constitutional amendment prohibiting "spe-
cial protection" to gays is unconstitutional, it only seems logical
174 Equality Found., 518 U.S. at 1001.
175 See id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See id.
179 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (stating
that a state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual lib-
erties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution"); NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 5, § 14.30, at 853 n.31 ("State supreme courts have the
authority to grant greater degrees of individual liberties than are required by the
United States Constitution; if the grant of additional freedom... is based upon state
rather than federal law, the Supreme Court should not overrule the state court deci-
sion."); see also Bluefield Community Hosp., Inc. v. Anziulewicz, 737 F.2d 405, 409
(4th Cir. 1984) (agreeing with the premise that a state constitution may grant a
higher level of protection than the federal constitution).
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that a city charter amendment prohibiting "special protection" to
gays should also be constitutionally unacceptable.
D. On Remand to the Sixth Circuit (Equality Foundation IV)
The Sixth Circuit on remand adhered to its earlier deci-
sion.180 The court applied the rational basis test, as did the Su-
preme Court in Evans, and concluded that the Cincinnati Char-
ter Amendment was rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose.181  The court then compared Evans's
Amendment 2 to Equality Foundation's Issue 3, and distin-
guished the two, largely on the ground that the action in Cincin-
nati, on a municipal level, was not as serious a potential disad-
vantage as Colorado's enactment, which affected the entire
state.182 The Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that, in contrast
to Colorado's Amendment 2, Cincinnati's Issue 3 survived ra-
tional basis analysis, followed its earlier decision, and upheld the
Charter Amendment.183 The Sixth Circuit also later rejected a
petition for a rehearing en banc,18 and distinguished Evans,
stating, "[elven the staunchest proponents of the Supreme
Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, readily admit that the Court
in that case purposely crafted a narrow opinion focused on the
precise factual situation presented by Colorado's Amendment
2."185 A dissent, however, was filed 186 in which five judges of the
Sixth Circuit stated that they believed that the panel decision in
180 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
365 (1998).
181 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d at 294-95 (explaining that although the
Evans Court applied rational basis and overturned Colorado's Amendment, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed its earlier decision, applying rational basis to the Cincinnati
Charter Amendment and upholding it).
1 See id. at 296 (stating that "the Cincinnati Charter Amendment had no such
sweeping and conscience-shocking effect, because.., it applied only at the lowest
(municipal) level of government"). This seems to be in accord with Justice Scalia's
dissent when the writ of certiorari was granted and the case was remanded to the
Sixth Circuit. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text (discussing dissent
from decision to remand).
183 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289, 301.
184 See Equality Found., Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 94-3855, 94-3973, 94-
3855, 1998 WL 101701 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
185 Id. at *1.
186 See id. at *3.
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Equality Foundation !V 187 "conflicts with the Supreme Court's
decision in [Romer v. Evans]."188
E. The Supreme Court Denied Certiorari
Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ
of certiorari on October 13, 1998.189 Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, filed a memorandum opinion, ex-
plaining that "the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not
a ruling on the merits."190 Justice Stevens added that the "Court
does not normally make an independent examination of state law
questions that have been resolved by a court of appeals" and
thus, the Court declined the case. 191 Since the vigorous dissent
from the Sixth Circuit's denial of a rehearing en banc reveals
that there is disagreement among the judges of that circuit as to
whether Equality Foundation was properly decided, 192 it seems
uncertain to say, as Justice Stevens does, that the state law
question was "resolved" by a court of appeals. Nonetheless, the
Court denied certiorari, and it is left to another day, and another
case, to see if Evans was properly applied.
III: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN DECIDING EQUALITY
FOUNDATION
In Romer v. Evans,193 the question was whether Colorado's
Amendment 2, adopted in a statewide voter referendum, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Amendment 2 prohibited any leg-
islation, at state or municipal level, granting protected status or
protecting individuals against discrimination based on sexual
orientation. It was a self-executing statute, having the effect of
automatically rescinding some local laws in cities within the
state which granted expansive anti-discrimination protection,
and included protection against anti-gay bias. Furthermore,
since it was a state constitutional measure, a change required
187 128 F.3d 289.
188 Equality Found., 1998 WL 101701, at *3.
189 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S.
Ct. 365 (1998).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 366
192 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent in the
denial for a rehearing).
193 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see supra notes 109-32 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the facts and rationale of Evans).
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the arduous process of first amending the state constitution, and
then lobbying to get desired local legislation enacted. Also, the
Evans Court held that the Amendment went beyond denying pro-
tected status; the Amendment prevented gays from asserting
bias even in common-law situations. 94
In Equality Foundation,'195 the question was whether Cincin-
nati's Issue 3, adopted in a city-wide voter referendum, violated
the Equal Protection Clause. Issue 3 prohibited any legislation
by the City Council protecting individuals based on sexual orien-
tation. It was a self-executing measure, and had the immediate
effect of automatically rescinding those portions of local ordi-
nances which granted expansive anti-discrimination protection
based on anti-gay bias. Furthermore, since it was a charter
amendment, analogous to a constitutional amendment,196 a
change required the arduous process of first amending the City
Charter, and then lobbying the City Council to enact the desired
ordinances.
The Evans Court examined the facts and found that there
was no rational basis justifying the Amendment. 97 The Court
found that the Amendment was both improperly motivated to
disadvantage an unpopular group, and was too far removed from
any suggested proper governmental objective.198
The Equality Foundation court, on remand after the Su-
preme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, examined the facts
and found that the Cincinnati Charter Amendment survived a
rational basis review.1 99 The distinctions the Sixth Circuit found
basically hinge on the difference between a statewide constitu-
tional amendment and a citywide charter amendment.2°O The
court, distinguishing Evans, focused mainly on the geographical
scope of the Cincinnati Amendment in comparison to the one in
194 See Evans, 517 U.S. at 630.
195 See supra notes 133-92 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and ra-
tionale of Equality Found.).
19 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 428 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997). "The [Cincinnati] City Charter is the primary governance
document of the city, akin to a constitution." Id.
197 See Evans, 517 U.S. at 632.
193 See id. at 635.
10 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289, 300 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 365 (1998).
200 See id. at 298-99.
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Colorado.20 1 Its rationale is similar to that articulated by Justice
Scalia, both in the Evans dissent,202 and in his dissent from the
Court's order to remand Equality Foundation to the Sixth Cir-
cuit.20 3 As was stated by the Sixth Circuit dissenters from the
denial for a rehearing en banc, since "a majority of the Supreme
Court obviously did not share the views of the dissent, using the
dissent's rationale is itself suspect."204
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning is also faulty in a distinction
drawn between the Cincinnati Charter Amendment and Colo-
rado's Issue 3.205 The court stressed that Colorado's Issue 3 was
overbroad.206 In making this point, the court quoted the Evans
Court, which stated, "it is a fair, if not necessary, inference from
the broad language of the amendment that it deprives gays and
lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that
prohibit arbitrary discrimination... . -o 7 The Sixth Circuit said
that the Cincinnati Charter Amendment had a "more restricted
reach" than the actual and potential sweep of the Colorado
Amendment.208 This reasoning is problematic, in that the court
focused on theoretical differences between the two enactments,
rather than their actual similarities.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit misread Evans when it
quoted Justice Kennedy describing the relationship between the
Colorado Amendment and rational basis in the terms that "
'Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional in-
quiry,' "209 and suggested that Justice Kennedy's statement
means that the Evans Court found that the Colorado Amend-
ment so obviously violated equal protection that even rational
201 See id. at 296-97 (comparing Cincinnati's Issue 3's scope which is limited to
the City, with Colorado's Amendment 3's scope, which covered an entire state).
202 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 126-32 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissent).
203 518 U.S. 1001 (1996) (mem.) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting from decision to remand); see supra notes 175-78 (discussing Justice
Scalia's dissent from the order to remand).
204 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 94-
3855, 94-3973, 94-4280, 1998 WL 101701 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (Gilman, Circuit
Judge, joined by Martin, C.J., and Daughtrey, Moore, Cole, Clay, JJ., dissenting).
205 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d at 295-96.
206 See id. at 295-97.
207 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996). Note, however, that the Evans
Court did not rely on this potential problem in making its decision. See id.
208 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d at 296.
209 Id. at 299 (quoting Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632).
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basis did not apply.210 This Comment suggests that this is a
faulty reading, which resulted in the misapplication of Evans
that was the result of the opinion in Equality Foundation.
IV: THE NEXT STEP: INTERMEDIATE REVIEW
FOR HOMOSEXUAL STATUS
Although the Supreme Court is loath to create "new" funda-
mental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by which chal-
lenged laws would be subject to strict scrutiny,21' there is already
in place a valid method of raising the bar for laws which disad-
vantage gays, and which would only require applying established
principles to a "new" situation. That mechanism is to grant
"quasi-suspect" rank to homosexual status, and apply intermedi-
ate level review to laws such as Cincinnati's Issue 3.
The district court in Equality Foundation I extensively dis-
cussed the factors for qualification as a "suspect" or "quasi-
suspect" class.212 These factors are: (1) whether the trait by
which an individual is categorized, in this case his or her sexual
orientation, bears any relationship to his or her ability to per-
form, or participate in, or contribute to society;213 (2) whether the
210 See Equality Found. IV, 128 F.3d at 297 (misinterpreting Evans as saying
that Amendment 2 "defies" conventional equal protection analysis, and that the or-
dinary standards of review were "irrelevant").
211 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (explaining the reluctance
to find "new" fundamental rights, in the course of holding that there is no funda-
mental right to engage in consensual, homosexual sodomy).
212 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 439 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that homosexuals met the criteria for semi-
suspect class). As discussed supra notes 180-88 and the accompanying text, how-
ever, that decision was rejected by the Sixth Circuit, which concluded that gays are
not quasi-suspect. See Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1995). On re-
mand, the Sixth Circuit, in Equality Foundation IV, held that "homosexuals [do] not
constitute either a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect class' because the conduct which
defined them as homosexuals was constitutionally proscribable." Equality Found.
IV, 128 F.3d 289, 293 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) (adhering to
its earlier decision); Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 266-67 & n.2. "[Alny attempted
identification of homosexuals by non-behavioral attributes could have no meaning,
because the law could not successfully categorize persons 'by subjective and unap-
parent characteristics such as innate desires, drives, and thoughts.' " Equality
Found. IV, 128 F.3d 289, 293; Equality Found. III, 54 F.3d at 267.
213 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)
(observing that, in gender based cases, what" 'differentiates sex from such nonsus-
pect statuses as intelligence or physical disability.., is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or contribute to society' "
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality)); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (noting that "the weak congruence between gender
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members of the group have any control over the trait by which
they are categorized, which in Equality Foundation is their sex-
ual orientation;214 (3) whether the group's defining characteristic,
sexual orientation, is immutable;215 (4) whether that group has
suffered a history of discrimination based on the trait by which
they are classified; for gays, their sexual orientation;216 and (5)
whether the class is "politically powerless."217
Applying these factors to homosexuals, it seems clear that a
person's sexual orientation has nothing to do with his or her
ability to perform, participate in, or contribute to, society, which
is the first factor. The only bar a person's sexual orientation has
and the characteristic or trait that gender purport(s) to represent"); Mathews v. Lu-
cas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (suggesting that since illegitimacy "bears no relation to
an individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society" that a higher than
rational basis scrutiny might be warranted); Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at
434-35 (discussing the five factors). But see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (holding men-
tal retardation not entitled to intermediate review because the "mentally retarded
have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world"); Massachu-
setts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (finding rational basis
appropriate in equal protection challenge to police department's mandatory retire-
ment age because age could have a bearing on an individual's ability to do that par-
ticular job).
214 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (indicating that "[b]ecause illegitimacy is be-
yond the individual's control," that is an important factor in deciding whether to ap-
ply a "heightened review"); Lucas, 427 U.S. at 505 (same); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686
(1973) (gender); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (stating that legislation
that "impos[es] special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances
beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Four-
teenth Amendment was designed to abolish"); Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at
434-35 (discussing the five factors).
215 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43 (asserting that the mentally retarded are
immutably different from other people); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; Equality Found.
II, 860 F. Supp. at 434-35 (discussing the five factors). But see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
442-43 n.10 (suggesting that immutability is not unanimously considered a relevant
factor, and stating that" 'classifications based on physical disability and intelligence
are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert
that immutability is relevant' ") (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 150 (1980)).
216 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85 (acknowledging that women have endured
a long history of gender-based discrimination); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (explaining
that discrimination is an important factor in equal protection analyses because dis-
crimination is not likely to be addressed by legislative action); Murgia, 427 U.S. at
313 (concluding that uniformed police officers over the age of fifty are not a suspect
class, in part because they have not been subject to regular or purposeful discrimi-
nation); Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 434-35 (discussing the five factors).
217 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (consid-
ering whether the group has been "relegated to such a position of political power-
lessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess"); Equality Found. 11, 860 F. Supp. at 434-35 (discussing the five factors).
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on one's participation in society is when hostility engendered by
others' fear and hatred inhibits a gay person. Homosexuals thus
meet the first of the criteria identified by the Equality Founda-
tion district court decision. As to the second factor, whether
members of the group-homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals-
have any control over their sexual orientation, the current scien-
tific consensus is that one's sexual identity is established at a
young age and is not volitional.218 The third factor, immutability,
may not even be a key element, as discussed above,219 but the
same scholars who now believe that homosexuality is not voli-
tional, also believe it to be immutable.220 The fourth factor,
whether the group has suffered a history of discrimination based
on their sexual orientation, may be established by a look in the
newspapers. One of myriad examples is the recent tragedy of
Matthew Shepard, who was savagely beaten to death in Wyo-
ming because he was gay.22' Also, the common practice of stay-
ing "in the closet"-hiding one's sexual orientation-is surely a
technique used to avoid the discrimination which an openly gay
person is likely to be subjected to. The final criterion is whether
the class is "politically powerless." An examination of Cincin-
nati's Human Rights Ordinance makes evidence of gays' political
powerlessness clear. The HRO protects Cincinnati's citizens
from discrimination based on race, color, sex, disability, religion,
national or ethnic origin, age, HIV status, Appalachian regional
ancestry, and marital status,222-a far more expansive list than
is required by federal law-and it once included sexual orienta-
218 See, e.g., Equality Foundation H, 860 F. Supp. at 424 (describing testimony of
Dr. John Gonsiorek, that "sexual orientation is an involuntary status, that it sets in
at an early age, that it is unamenable to techniques designed to change it"); see also
Patric L. Deprey, Readers' Forum: Firing of Lesbian Employee Deplored, THE
COURIER JOURNAL, Dec. 8, 1998, at 8A, available in 1998 WL 2118749 (noting that
the APA and other groups largely believe that homosexuality is inborn); Psychiatric
Group Condemns Treatment Aimed at Converting Gays, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 12, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 23015495 (discussing theory
that people are born homosexual). But see Bud Seary, Don't Buy Into the Gay Rights
Groups Sales Pitch, THE FRESNO BEE, May 10, 1997, at B9 (asserting that while bi-
ology may play a part, homosexuality is primarily rooted in environmental factors).
219 See supra note 215 (discussing immutability factor).
22 See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 424; see also Deprey, supra note 218;
Psychiatric Group, supra note 218.
221 See Alan Lupo, Hate Crimes are a Big Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25 1998, at
6; Two Women Deny Tie to a Gay Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1998, at A 20.
See Equality Found. II, 860 F. Supp. at 421 (discussing the Human Rights
Ordinance).
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tion among the other protected groups. The fact that after Issue
3 homosexuals have not only been removed from that list, but
have had an onerous procedural burden placed in their way of
ever getting back on that list again is evidence of their political
powerlessness.
As it did with the gender cases,223 the Court may already be
cautiously moving toward recognizing status-based sexual orien-
tation as a quasi-suspect class meriting intermediate-level re-
view. In Reed v. Reed,224 the Court purported to be using rational
basis review to strike down a statute that classified along gender
lines.22 5 A few years later, in Craig v. Boren,226 the Court ar-
ticulated a standard that is now known as intermediate review
for the quasi-suspect class, women.227 The Craig Court derived
its intermediate test from Reed, although the Reed Court had
announced it was applying rational basis.22 8 Similarly, the Court
in Romer v. Evans claimed it applied rational basis review.229 In
stressing the likelihood that animus toward homosexuals moti-
vated the legislation, however, it dismissed government purposes
it could have found legitimate, which suggests the Court was in
fact applying some heightened standard. 30 It is possible that
just as the Court has signaled, in United States v. Virginia,231
that women as a quasi-suspect group may be entitled to more-
than-intermediate level review,23 2 by the Court's rigorous appli-
223 See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text (discussing the development of
intermediate scrutiny for gender cases).
=' 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
225 See id. at 76 (stating that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relationship to the object of the legislation' ") (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920)).
2w 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
= See id.
22 See id. at 197 (relying on Reed and articulating the test for gender cases re-
quiring that a challenged law "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
229 See Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (stating that "a law must bear a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate governmental purpose, and Amendment 2 does not") (cita-
tions omitted).
230 Indeed, the Equality Foundation court did find almost exactly the same pur-
poses legitimate. See Equality Found. V, 128 F.3d 289, 300 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998) (finding the same purposes legitimate).
231 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
m See id. at 533-34 (requiring "exceedingly persuasive" justification standard,
which is, possibly, a more-than-intermediate level of review).
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cation of rational basis in Romer v. Evans,23 the groundwork
may be under way toward quasi-suspect classification for homo-
sexuals.
CONCLUSION
In deciding Equality Foundation, the Sixth Circuit misap-
plied Romer v. Evans. Under Evans's rational basis analysis,
where state or local government action is motivated by fear or
hatred toward an identifiable group, and the connection between
that action and any legitimate goal is too tenuous to be credible,
the legislation must fail. The Evans Court was too cautious. If it
had distinguished between homosexual conduct and homosexu-
ality as a status, it would have been less constrained by the Bow-
ers v. Hardwick precedent, and the Court could have acknowl-
edged that homosexual status meets all the established criteria
for quasi-suspect classification, meriting intermediate-level re-
view. Under intermediate scrutiny, future constitutional chal-
lenges of similar state constitutional and city charter amend-
ments will more predictably yield the result the Supreme Court
mandated in Romer v. Evans.
Jill Dinneen
= 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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